If applied as a longer transit approach lane see page , buses may bypass longer queues. Queue jumps can be applied at near-side, far-side, or non-stop configurations. At near-side pull-out stops, the bus completes loading before rolling forward onto a loop detector that gives priority. At far-side or non-stop locations, the bus receives a priority signal treatment see page , and proceeds either into a far-side stop or ahead of the traffic flow.
A bus head start can significantly improve bus performance by routing vehicles through congested intersections ahead of traffic. Guangwei Zhou and Albert Gan. Journal of Public Transportation, Vol 12, no. VISSIM modeling was used to demonstrate that transit gains the greatest benefit from a full queue bypass lane approaching a far-side stop. Zachary Bugg, et al. If vehicle right-turn volumes are high enough for right-turn queues to occur with regularity, right turns should be accommodated separately from transit in a turn pocket.
In cities where yield-to-transit laws are enforced, the queue jump may operate effectively without a dedicated transit signal phase. Buses must have access to a lane and the ability to reach the front of the queue at the beginning of the signal cycle. Buses receive a head start with an advance green. Separate signals must be used to indicate when transit proceeds and when general traffic proceeds. Transit signals can be either be a transit specific signal head or a louvered or visibility-limited green indication, making it visible only to the right-most lane.
Though effectiveness is dependent on wide-ranging characteristics, far-side stop locations have been shown to improve travel time savings more than near-side locations. Burak Cesme, Selman Z. In our case, the private outcome is a composition of own monetary payoff and waiting time.
The most common queue jumping techniques are revealed
For egoistic players procedures only play a role if they have a direct impact on their outcomes. Using backward induction and considering that our game is played one-shot, players A and C anticipate that punishment by player B is an empty threat. Consequently, they do not fear any punishment in stage one of the game.
That means for our game: in all treatments where there is a possibility for bargaining i. By mutually accepting the price for the queue jump, players A and C realize a Pareto improvement while player B is not worse off in terms of outcomes. Inequality aversion means that individuals are willing to give up some personal payoff to yield more equitable outcomes Fehr and Schmidt, ; Bolton and Ockenfels, In Appendix B we formulate the equilibrium predictions for Fehr-Schmidt preferences regarding the two dimensions of monetary payoff and waiting time in detail.
Thus, offering 0. Player C will be better off if she jumps the queue from 30 to 10 minutes of waiting time , subsequently receives 15 punishment minutes from player B this equalizes the waiting time of all three players and ends up with a final waiting time of 25 minutes. Player B will assign 15 punishment minutes to player A and to player C, such that all players will have a final waiting time of 25 minutes.
For conciseness we relegate the details of our predictions to Appendix B. Yet, recent experimental and behavioral economic literature Bolton et al. Following Oberholzer-Gee , we believe that some individuals possess procedural preferences for fair queuing. Consequently, individuals regard it as a violation of fairness if others try to jump the queue or circumvent its natural order by monetary deals, even if this would generate Pareto improvements for the respective individuals Sandel, Again, money is a good and waiting time is a bad, i.
The greater the parameter , the more disutility individual will suffer in case of a violation of the procedure. Kohlberg describes that on the post-conventional moral level, a given outcome may be valuated differently if reached by dictatorial decision rather than by democratic procedures Kohlberg , p.
From a normative point of view, the significance of process over outcome is also addressed in political philosophy, where the formal aspect of a discourse is often considered to be more important than material outcomes see, for one, Habermas, Individual is however able to attenuate this disutility by retribution.
Of course, retribution for violating the procedure only makes sense if the violation has happened in the first place. Hence, an individual in our case only player B is able to attenuate her disutility from a violation of the procedure by retributing this violation, in our case via punishment. The parameter equals zero in any case and players A and C do not suffer any disutility if they agree to let player C go home earlier.
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Subsequently players A and C do not have to worry about retributive punishment by player B who is passive , but they might themselves suffer from the violation of the procedure depending on their individual. If is comparatively small compared to the gain in utility from the successful bargaining, then players A and C may seal a deal and violate the procedure. That is, they will increase their total utility albeit the disutility from the violation of the procedure i.
If, conversely, is comparatively large, then player A may not accept any offers and player C may refuse to make any offer. As the form of such a function and the continuous space are not essential for our intuition that such retributive punishment exists, we refrain from discussing this point further. Rabin, ; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, ; Falk and Fischbacher, One major difference is that it is not the intention of a player towards another player that matters here, but the retribution of a violation of the queueing procedure.
A standard reciprocity model without taking the procedure into account could not deliver our predictions below. Standard reciprocity models typically rely on observing the intention of others towards oneself in stage 1 and reacting to it in stage 2 a classic example for this is the ultimatum game. In stage 2 player B reacts to the decisions of players A and C in stage 1. Note that the decisions of players A and C however do not affect player B and therefore do not carry information about their favorable or harmful intentions towards player B. Rather, the decisions of players A and C affect the violation of the queueing procedure.
The most common queue jumping techniques are revealed - Liverpool Echo
Hence, the procedure could be regarded as a fourth agent and reciprocity would be indirect in the sense of downstream indirect reciprocity. This retributive punishment is only useful if the queue was jumped, i. We assume that players A and C are informed and sophisticated enough to anticipate this possible retributive punishment by player B. Compared to JUMP, there is an additional incentive for players A and C not to seal a deal: the expectation of punishment and the associated utility loss.
The same intuition applies to player C subjects. Neither payoff maximization nor inequality aversion predict this order of behavior.
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Table 1. Predictions over treatments and over models. Table 1 summarizes the predictions over the treatments for the different types of players in each model. The sessions were conducted in the time period from August to October and May Subjects were invited to the experiment from the student pool using h-root Bock et al. They received the information that a session would last one hour at the most and that the average remuneration of the laboratory is 10 EUR per hour.
We provided the players with an endowment that allows for bargaining in a sufficiently large action space. At the same time, we guaranteed that no subject left the experiment with less than the guaranteed 5 EUR. Before the beginning of a session, students entered the laboratory and drew the number of their computer terminal from a stack of shuffled seating cards.
We employ a between-subjects and one-shot design to avoid any strategic concerns. We took great care that all subjects put away all of their belongings and any electronic devices which could make the waiting time less costly. The subjects were then seated at their assigned terminal. The experimenter announced some general rules of the laboratory, all subjects received written instructions for their respective treatment, and the experimenter read the instructions out loud.
The instructions explain that there are three restrictively two subjects forming a queue and that this group will remain the same during the experiment. They were informed about receiving an equal monetary endowment at the beginning, but the order in which subjects are allowed to leave the experiment and the final payoff would be determined by their decisions in the experiment. Note that we did not let the computer program assign roles in our experiment.
Rather, subjects drew envelopes out of a non-transparent bag. We chose this procedure to increase the personal identification of a subject with her role and the according moral considerations when jumping the queue inspired by Eliaz and Rubinstein, This experimental set-up allowed us to rule out the possibility of social costs of jumping the queue. After the queuing 15 We also aimed to mitigate the problem of perceived unfairness due to an arbitrary assignment of positions.
We used z-tree Fischbacher, to program and run our experiment. Concerning the number of independent observations in our study, we recognize that there is an ongoing discussion on the ethics of data collection in psychological and economic experiments. Our objective was to meet the requirements for authors formulated by Simmons et al.
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A central requirement is that there should be at least 20 independent observations per treatment. We collected more than 20 independent observations groups for all of our treatments. Overall, we collected data of subjects. First we will examine the behavior of player C subjects, second of player A subjects, and finally of player B subjects. Table 2 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics.